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-IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DALLAS B. JOHNSON and 
JESSIE W. JOHNSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
R.H. SESSIONS and HAZEL JUNE 
DEAN' Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12072 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
In August of 1969, plaintiffs Dallas B. Johnson 
and Jessie B. Johnson, his wife, initiated an action in 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
to quiet title to a strip of land located between their 
property and the property of defendant R. H. Sessions. 
Plaintiffs also prayed in their complaint for an order 
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requiring the defendant to remove certain improvements 
which he had erected on the strip of land and for dam-
ages as a result of def endanf s past use of the property. 
In December of 1969 the court granted plaintiffs' mo-
tion and added as a party defendant Hazel June Dean, 
who also has some interest in the property of defendant 
R. H. Sessions. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 25, 1970, the case was tried to the court, 
sitting without a jury. Testimony and documentary evi-
dence were presented, the matter was argued and sub-
mitted, and the court thereupon entered its Memoran-
dum Decision on March 26, 1970. The decision was in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. Con-
trary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 52 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no findings of fact and 
conclusions of law have yet been entered. However, 
inasmuch as the Memorandum Decision ref used to 
plaintiffs the relief requested in their complaint, they 
have taken this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek relief from the effect of the decision 
of the trial court. The Memorandum Decision is incon-
sistent with the facts presented in the course of the trial 
and the applicable law pertaining thereto. Plaintiffs ask 
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that the decision be reversed and that a judgment be 
entered granting to them the relief requested in their 
complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs purchased the property on which they 
reside in December of 1961 ( T-2) . They have been in 
possession of the property continuously since that time 
and they have regularly paid the taxes on the property 
(T-4). The deeds by which plaintiffs acquired their 
property and the abstract of title which they received at 
the time of the purchase covered all of Lot 42, Block 2, 
Hillcrest Subdivision (Exhibits 1-P, 2-P, and 3-P). 
In June of 1969 plaintiffs hired the firm of Coon, 
King and Knowlton to make a survey of their property. 
The survey was completed under the personal direction 
of Hooper Knowlton, Jr., a consulting engineer and 
land surveyor (T-18) and a drawing (Exhibit 5-D) 
was thereafter prepared of the property. The survey 
revealed that the defendants' garage, driveway, and 
garden (at the rear of the property) all encroach on 
property properly contained in Lot 42, all of which 
property was purchased by the plaintiffs (T-5, 19, 20, 
21) . The width of the encroachment varies from about 
81;2 inches to 21h feet (T-20, 21) and has an average 
width, over the length of plaintiffs' property, of approx-
imately 2 feet (T-5, 21). 
The record is silent on when defendants' garage 
and driveway were constructed. However, defendant 
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R.H. Sessions testified that in 1948 a fence was erected 
separating the two adjoining pieces of property ( T-25). 
He was not asked and did not say whether the fence 
erected at that time was in the same place as the present 
fence and retaining walls. 
In 1962 and 1963, plaintiffs constructed concrete 
retaining walls along the then existing fence line in the 
front and back of defendants' garage (T-8, 27). De-
fendant Session agreed to the erection of the retaining 
walls and apparently allowed plaintiffs to come on his 
property in connection with the construction (T-7, 8, 
2.6). 
Defendant R. H. Sessions testified to a conversa-
tion with Ira Coult in 1948 concerning the fence to be 
erected ( T-25, 26). However, the testimony of Sessions 
did not indicate where the fence was to be erected, 
whether the parties knew the location of the true bound-
ary line or whether Mr. Coult had such an interest in 




THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS, 
THROUGH A SERIES OF CASES, DEFINED 
THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF A 
"BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE." 
DEFENDANTS' PROOF WAS NOT SUFFICl-
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ENT UNDER THESE WELL-ESTABLISHED 
REQUIREMENTS AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUCH A 
BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE 
HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. 
Plaintiffs' proof clearly showed that they are the 
record owners of all of Lot 42, including a strip approx-
imately two feet in width which is presently being oc-
cupied by the defendants. The burden then shifted to 
defendants to somehow justify their occupancy of plain-
tiffs' property. The trial court, in its Memorandum De-
cision, concluded that the fence line has been established 
as the boundary between the adjoining pieces of prop-
erty "by long acquiescence," apparently basing its de-
cision on the legal theory of "boundary line by acqui-
" escence. 
The Honorable Court has, in a number of cases, 
considered the requirements for establishing that the 
boundary between adjoining pieces of property is in a 
location other than where the property descriptions con-
tained in the pertinent recorded documents pertaining 
to the two pieces of property would place it. The fol-
lowing must be established: 
I. That at one time there was uncertainty or a 
dispute between the landowners concerning the 
true location of a boundary line; 
2. This uncertainty must have been resolved 
by a mutual agreement recognizing some visible 
marker or line as the boundary; and 
5 
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3. The agreement and the new boundary estab-
lished thereby must then be mutually acquiesced 
in for a considerable period of time thereafter. 
[Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 
1417 ( 1928) and cases cited therein. J 
These requirements have been further refined and 
discussed in a series of decisions, including some that are 
particularly pertinent to the instant case. In the case of 
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949), 
the court held that 
. . . there must be some uncertainty or a dispute 
between the adjoining owners as to the location 
of the true boundary line before a fence which 
they subsequently erect to resolve their differ-
ences and in which they acquiesce for a long 
period of time, may be taken as the agreed 
boundary line. 
The court stated that being ignorant about the line is 
not equivalent to uncertainty and then went on to say 
that, 
The mere fact that a fence happens to be put 
up and neither party does anything about it for 
a long period of time, will not establish it as the 
true boundary. 
The record in this case is totally devoid of proof 
relating to any uncertainty ever having existed as to the 
location of the true boundary line. As indicated in the 
Statement of Facts, the only thing that was testified to 
by defendant Sessions was that a fence was erected be-
tween the two pieces of property in 1948. He did not say 
whether or not that fence was erected in the same place 
6 
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as the presently existing fence and retaining walls. He 
was not asked and he did not say whether the location 
of the true boundary line was known or unknown at that 
time. Thus, there was no showing by the defendants that 
any uncertainty or dispute ever existed with reference to 
the true location of the boundary line. 
The second requirement of a "boundary line by 
acquiescence" is that the uncertainty or dispute must be 
resolved by an agreement, presumably between the ad-
joining landowners, recognizing some visible line as the 
boundary. Here again, defendants' proof was lacking 
on this essential requirement. Defendant Sessions re-
ferred ( T-25, 26) to a conversation and an agreement 
with someone named Ira Coult, who was then occupying 
the property now owned by plaintiffs. In view of the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-24-2 ( 3) ( 1953), 
there is considerable question about whether the trial 
court should have allowed this particular testimony to 
stand. However, even if it was properly allowed, it is 
still not helpful since there is no designation of where the 
fence was to be and what relationship, if any, such fence 
had to the presently existing fence and retaining walls. 
Even if the testimony of defendant Sessions con-
cerning the conversation which he allegedly had with 
Ira Coult had been specific as to where the fence was to 
be erected, plaintiffs submit that their rebuttal evidence 
clearly showed that Ira Coult had no authority to make 
any kind of a binding agreement with regard to the 
property now owned by plaintiffs. 
7 
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Mary Sears Coult Endsley was called as a witness 
and she testified that in 1948, when defendant Sessions 
allegedly had the conversation just referred to with Ira 
Coult, Mr. Coult was living there as a "renter" (T-34). 
She stated further that the property had previously be-
longed to Joe Coult, Sr. When he died in 1938, five 
children survived him ( T-34) . If, as the testimony of 
Mrs. Endsley suggests, Joe Coult, Sr. left no will, each 
of the five surviving children succeeded to an equal, un-
divided interest in the property [Utah Code Anrwtated 
74-4-5(2) (1953) ]. 
Thus, in 1948, at the time of the alleged conversa-
tion and agreement between Ira Coult and defendant 
Sessions, Ira Coult had only an undivided one-fifth in-
terest in the property. He was also the tenant of the per-
sons owning the balance of the interest in the property. 
Unless he is specifically empowered to do so by the other 
owners, one of a number of tenants in common cannot 
make any kind of a binding agreement respecting the 
commonly owned property. Particularly is this true 
where the effect of the alleged agreement would be to 
give away a significant portion of the total property (on 
T-5 plaintiff testified that the strip in question consti-
tuted approximately one-twentieth of his total property. 
This testimony was not contradicted and was confirmed 
by Mr. Knowlton, the surveyor, on T-19, 20, 21). 
As indicated above, the defendants had the burden 
of proving the establishment of a "boundary line by 
acquiescence." They failed to prove the first two re-
8 
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quirements established by this Honorable Court and 
plaintiffs submit that they also failed to establish the 
third requirement-long mutual acquiescence and recog-
nition of a specific, visible marker or line as the bound-
ary. 
The first time, chronologically, that the record 
clearly speaks of some visible marker in the same loca-
tion as the presently existing fence and retaining walls 
is in 1962. It was in that year that the plaintiffs con-
structed at the front and rear of their property retaining 
walls, which retaining walls still stand. Defendant Ses-
sions did not say where the fence allegedly discussed 
with Ira Coult in 1948 was to be erected or where or 
when it was finally erected. Between 1948 and 1962 the 
location of the fence could have been changed any num-
ber of times. Thus, the only evidence in the record as to 
the length of time that a visible marker has existed along 
the line that defendants now seek to have declared the 
boundary is that presented by plaintiff, and it goes back 
only to 1962. 
In the case of King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 
P.2d 893 ( 1963), the opinion of the Court contained an 
analysis which was clearly marked "dictum." This analy-
sis concluded that twenty years was the proper period to 
be used as a "yardstick" in these cases. All of the justices 
concurred with the opinion of the court and it thus ap-
pears that there was general agreement with the appro-
priateness of this particular guideline. 
9 
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The record in the instant case does not establish the 
existence of "a visible marker or line" in the location that 
defendants have attempted to establish as the boundary 
line earlier than 1962. This eight-year period is less than 
half of the period referred to in the King v. Fronk de· 
cision as the "yardstick." 
The Utah decisions have recognized that under 
certain circumstances a rebuttable presumption of a 
boundary line by acquiescence arises. If the party seek· 
ing to establish a boundary line by acquiescence intro- , 
duces competent evidence on each of the elements, the 
burden then shifts to the other party to overcome the 
presumption. However, 
... if the party claiming title by acquiescence 
fails to carry his burden and raise the presump· 
tion, then there is no case at all. [Fuoco v. Wil· 
liams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964), 18 
Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966) ]. 
Here the defendants did not introduce competent 
evidence on any of the required elements of a boundary 
line by acquiescence. In addition, plaintiffs, in their 
rebuttal evidence, further negated defendants' case by 
showing that Ira Court had no authority to enter into ' 
any agreement respecting the boundary line. 
One other very recent decision of this Court should 
be noted. In the case of Carter v. Lindner, 23 Utah 2d 
204, 460 P.2d 830 (1969), the Court held that where 
one property owner gave an adjoining property owner 
permission to build a fence in a particular location and 
10 
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where there was no uncertainty as to the true location 
of the boundary at the time of the giving of permission, 
no boundary line by acquiescence could be established. 
vVithout a dispute and uncertainty as to the 
true location of the boundary line there can be 
no boundary line by acquiescence under an oral 
agreement between adjoining property owners. 
Thus, even if in 1948 Ira Coult did validly give per-
mission for defendant Sessions to build his fence on 
the line in question, he may have done so knowing 
where the true boundary was and, under these circum-
stances, there would only have been created a temporary 
right to use the property and not a boundary line by 
acquiescence. When defendants failed to affirmatively 
show that uncertainty existed as to the true boundary 
in 1948, they failed to establish an essential element 
of their case. 
Plaintiffs clearly established their legal, record 
ownership of the disputed strip of land. Defendants 
then had the burden of establishing a right to the land 
under the equitable theory of boundary line by acqui-
escence. However, they failed to prove a single one 
of the essential elements of this equitable theory. They 
thus failed to meet their burden of proof. 
POINT II 
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF "ESTOP-
PEL" HAS, IN THE AREA OF BOUNDARY 
DISPUTES, BEEN FORMALIZED AND IS 
11 
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THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF "BOUND. 
ARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE". PLAIN-
TIFFS' CONDUCT WAS NOT SUCH THAT 
THEY SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM AS. 
SERTING THEIR LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF 
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION. 
In its Memorandum Decision the trial court held 
that the new boundary line had been established by 
"long acquiescence" and that "plaintiffs should be estop-
ped from now asserting that the line, as established 
by the fence, is not the correct and proper boundary 
line, in view of their own conduct." The lower court 
thus sought to base its decision on both the theory of 
boundary line by acquiescence and on the principle of 
estoppel. 
In 12 Am. Jur. 2d "Boundaries" §89 is found a 
discussion of the application of the principle of estoppel 
to boundary line problems. The recognition by courts 
of equity of a boundary line in a location other than 
where the properly recorded documents would place it 
1 
is an application of the principle of estoppel, and such 
recognition occurs where it would be "inequitable" for 
parties to attempt to insist on the "true line" as the 
proper boundary. 
Utah, along with other states, has formalized the 
doctrine of estoppel as applied to boundary disputes 
and has developed specific guidelines concerning when 
the doctrine should be applied. These guidelines ar.e 
identified under the heading "boundary line by acqm· 
12 
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escence". This concept is an application of the doctrine 
of estoppel and constitutes the single manner in which 
the doctrine of estoppel is to be applied to boundary 
line disputes. Plaintiffs submit that, with regard to 
boundary line questions, the doctrine of estoppel has 
not been given recognition by this Court other than 
through the principle of "boundary line by acquies-
cence". Thus, estoppel cannot constitute a separate 
ground upon which to base the trial court's decision. 
Unless all of the requisites of "boundary line by acqui-
escence" are present, the doctrine of "estoppel" has no 
application in these cases. 
However, even if the doctrine of estoppel is en-
titled to separate recognition, the conduct of plain-
tiffs was not such as to estop them from claiming the 
full extent of the land they purchased. In 12 Am. Jur. 
2d "Boundaries" §89 is the following language regard-
ing estoppel. 
It is essential to the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel generally that the party sought to be 
estopped should have had knowledge of the facts, 
or at least that he should have had the means at 
hand of knowing all the facts or have been in 
such a position that he ought to have known them; 
this rule applies with particular force where the 
case involves title to land or a dispute as to a 
boundary and there was no negligence of the 
party sought to be estopped in failing to assert 
his right. 
In the instant case the plaintiffs purchased their prop-
erty in December of 1961. They did not know that the 
13 
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defendants were using and claiming a portion of theh 
property until June of 1969, when they paid to have 
a survey prepared. Within three months of the date 
of the discovery of the encroachment, the present action ' 
was initiated. 
Plaintiffs had no way of knowing that defendants · 
were using their property until the completion of the 
survey. As soon as they discovered the encroachment · 
they took prompt and proper action to enforce their 
legal rights. As the above quotation from Am. Jur. , 
indicates, estoppel is properly applied only where a 
party knows the necessary facts and then fails to do 
anything for an unreasonable length of time. 
Plaintiffs' conduct was entirely reasonable under 
the circumstances and estopping them from recoving 
1 
the property which they purchased would be inappro· 
priate and inequitable. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs clearly established their legal title to ' 
the strip of property in question. Defendants then failed 
to introduce competent evidence on any of the essential 
requirements of a "boundary line by acquiescence". 
Also, in view of the facts of the case, a decision in favor 
of defendants on the theory of "estoppel" cannot be 
justified. The trial court thus erred in deciding the issues 
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiffs. 
14 
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Plaintiffs pray for reversal of the decision of the 
trial court and for a decision granting to them the relief 
improperly refused them by the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS, 
CAMPBELL & COWLEY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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